A World In Disarray

The author’s first suggestion is to avoid great-power rivalries with China and Russia. If anything came of it militarily, it would be devastating. Beyond that, it would distract from making headway on important matters where cooperation could make a difference. The chapter title refers to the rivalry between Athens and Sparta as described by the Greek historian Thucydides almost two and a half millennia ago. It’s natural, he wrote, to fall into a “Thucydides Trap”—that is, for an established power (Sparta at the time) to view a rising power (Athens) with suspicion and try to prevent its rise. The United States, however, should resist this urge with regard to China.

While Haass does not see any ambition by China or Russia to take over the world, he does envision that their regional aggression might pose a problem. To counter this threat, the United States should have a local military presence with allies, focused only on conventional weapons, as deterrence. It also requires intensive diplomatic engagement to agree on what behavior is considered legitimate and then make sure this behavior is adhered to. Linkage and sanctions should be avoided. The former means tying one issue to another that is unrelated. Disagreement in one area should not preclude working together in another. As far as sanctions go, Haass considers them ineffective. Similarly, economic engagement might help prevent any wayward behavior by either country.

The United States should also return to the idea of foreign policy as focused on states’ external behavior. It cannot worry about influencing the internal affairs of China or Russia, Haass writes; any effort to do so would simply fail and, worse, ruin the relationship with them so nothing could get done. The watchword here is “integration.” As much as possible, the United States should cooperate with China and Russia and make them feel invested in world systems. Doing so will hopefully keep them from doing anything to jeopardize their stake in economic development and other areas, and instead incentivize them to do positive things.

This chapter reviews the author’s idea for creating a new world order—what he calls World Order 2.0. The idea of sovereignty established long ago at Westphalia should remain central, but because of globalization it needs to be updated. Instead of addressing only the rights of sovereign governments, it needs to expand to include their obligations to other nations. This he calls “sovereign obligation.”

He emphasizes that it’s different from the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility,” which is concerned with what happens within a nation’s borders. That idea stems from the Wilsonian tradition (named for President Woodrow Wilson) and is associated with presidents like Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush. His idea of sovereign obligation is more along the lines of realism, which Richard Nixon and George H. W. Bush practiced. Some people say foreign policy should include both, which Haass writes is “true in principle but less so in practice” (229). Others argue that promoting democracy through the Wilsonian approach will lead to more peace between nations in terms of sovereign obligation. The problem Haass sees with this view is that establishing a real, functional democracy in other countries is exceeding difficult.

Traditional realism focuses on relations between great powers, while sovereign obligation applies to all nations. Definitions of norms and processes for maintaining them need to be agreed on for legitimacy to exist. This is easier in such cases as when prohibiting states from acquiring territory through force and more challenging when it comes to internal issues. Haass recommends a bit of restraint with regard to the idea of R2P; it’s difficult to find common ground regarding its definition and means of enforcing it, so these will need to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. Above all, when invoked, R2P should be strictly humanitarian and never veer into regime change, as happened in Libya.

The chapter ends with a discussion of how this all plays out in terms of actual issues. Haass deals at length with the issue of weapons of mass destruction (mostly nuclear weapons) without coming to a solid conclusion. While the world can agree on the stance of nonproliferation, it will likely disagree about what to do once a nation possesses such weapons. North Korea provides the prime example for this dynamic.

Other areas like climate change would seem to fit sovereign obligation better. What a nation does within its borders can affect many other nations external to it. The 2015 climate change conference in Paris was a step in the right direction: Nations were not given strict goals but instead could create their own based on the worldwide goal of limiting the Earth’s temperature. Haass would like to see incentives added to this agreement for good measure. Another global issue, cyberspace, will need to be worked out in order to agree on norms and acceptable uses. Haass advocates less government restriction overall and an agreement on what kind of government activity is off limits in times of peace versus times of war (particularly concerning cyberattacks).

The United States needs to lead by example, as it cannot require of other countries what it fails to do itself. Agreeing on the process needed to ensure legitimacy is a separate step. No international body can supersede national sovereignty, nor should it. Regarding internal issues that have external ramifications, states should be encouraged to use “best practices.” Haass urges a pragmatic approach in all instances of multilateral relations, ensuring that the relevant actors work things out together. Finally, nonstate entities should be included, not just nations. As Haass writes, negotiating the rules of cyberspace without the likes of Apple and Google makes no sense.

After his foreign policy suggestions grouped by issue in the last chapter, Haass now turns to what should be done in geographic regions. He starts with the Asia-Pacific, the area he says will be crucial for world order in general. Economic interdependence and a balance of power should continue to be the pillars of policy here. He believes order depends on the presence of the United States in “diplomatic, economic, and military” affairs (260). Allies should be assured of US protection but also expected to act responsibly.

Haass recommends a regional security system much like the Helsinki Accords provided Europe in the 1970s. He also thinks that confidence-building measures (CBMs) with China, such as hotlines and advance notice of military exercises, could help reduce tensions in the region. North Korea needs to be dealt with by consulting allies as well as China. The top goal would be to convince the country to give up its nuclear program, which is unlikely; next would be a clear understanding among all the players of which North Korean actions would draw a military response. Including China in all this is critical, but consultations should not be dominated by a bilateral US-China relationship.

In South Asia, India is the most important relationship for the United States. It will become the world’s most populous country later this century and is important economically. Haass recommends urging India to improve relations with its neighbor Pakistan, which he considers among the most problematic nations. That it is a nuclear power and home to terrorist organizations makes it dangerous. Sanctions are largely ineffective and only weaken the government, so Haass writes that the best course of action is to provide a minimum level of support while incentivizing certain behavior with the promise of more support.

The author calls the Middle East region the biggest challenge of all. In the near future, there’s not a lot of opportunity for progress there, so it should be viewed “less in terms of what might be accomplished than what might be avoided” (269). However, it cannot be ignored because the United States still relies heavily on its oil. Haass lists the main priorities for American interests as follows: working to counter terrorism, trying to prevent any further nuclearization, and supporting Israel. Military action should not be ruled out if necessary.

Haass then discusses what not to do. While it’s not feasible to attempt wholesale reform of Middle Eastern societies (like George W. Bush tried in Iraq), efforts can be made to encourage progress in specific areas, such as reducing corruption and increasing opportunities for women. National borders will likely change since the area is in flux, but the United States should not worry about formalizing them at this point. Two exceptions are the Kurds and Palestinians, both of whom are stateless, and efforts should be made to provide statehood for both.

In terms of Europe, the United States cannot do much to influence the region. Haass thinks European countries need to work on resolving their own issues, among them defense and terrorism. NATO countries near Russia should be bolstered, and nations need to share more intelligence to help counter terrorist activities. Many countries also should do more to better integrate immigrant populations into their society. In addition, the European Union needs to be reformed so it better aligns political concerns with economic realities. The 2008 financial crisis exposed some of the challenges posed by the latter.

This final chapter details what the United States can do to help maintain world order. Despite being the most powerful country, it can’t do everything alone and will need partners, hence the concept of sovereign obligation discussed in Chapter 10. The focus here is what the United States can do internally, as Haass believes that “the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation” (290). For it to be a model for other countries, it must be seen as successful. This includes political, social, and economic aspects, but Haass focuses on the last as it provides stability and resources for all of them.

His prescription for improving economic success is to increase growth rates and decrease debt levels. The first steps are improving education at all levels, creating jobs through needed infrastructure projects, reforming immigration to attract and keep people with advanced degrees and skills, and lowering corporate tax rates. In terms of debt, he sees problems ahead with an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio. Heavy debt becomes a strategic issue as resources are increasingly required to finance debt and thus less available for all other programs. In short, “Mounting debt limits American flexibility and resilience” in all areas (296). Haass also thinks it will bring about the end of the American dollar as the world’s reserve currency as governments lose confidence in it and turn to alternatives.

All the hard choices demanded to boost the economy and rein in debt require a strong and functioning political system. This requirement presents a problem, as Haass sees it, since politics is failing. Political parties are weakening, and coalitions and compromise are scarce. Leadership and procedural reform are needed to change things so that the political process functions better. This would help provide the stability necessary in foreign policy to improve world order.