49 pages • 1 hour read
Alasdair MacIntyreA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
In the brief first chapter, MacIntyre proposes a thought experiment. He asks the reader to imagine a scenario in which the natural sciences were forgotten following a catastrophe. Human beings would be able to reassemble some of the ideas and concepts, but they would lack the necessary context to fully understand them. MacIntyre argues that this is exactly the state of “grave disorder” society is in when it comes to moral discussion. This is because we have largely “lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality” (2). MacIntyre proposes to trace the historical causes for this loss in the book.
MacIntyre introduces his thesis that “emotivism” is the operative context in which modern moral debate takes place. The fact that moral discussion proceeds on the basis of emotion instead of reason means that disagreements are “interminable,” never able to reach a consensus. MacIntyre presents three representative contemporary moral arguments involving war, abortion, and the government’s role in the administering of health care and education.
The key feature of these debates is the “conceptual incommensurability” of the way they are framed. Both sides of a debate express a logically-coherent argument, yet the premises employ different “normative or evaluative concept[s]” (8), so that there is no way to weigh the competing claims. One premise is simply asserted against another in a “shrill tone” of “assertion and counter-assertion” (8), and the discussion can proceed no further.
From this premise, MacIntyre hypothesizes that the arguers themselves have not reasoned their position out fully for themselves because they lack the powers of moral reasoning that society once possessed. Yet the fact that we try to give such debates the appearance of rational argument suggests that it is still an “aspiration” in our lives.
MacIntyre will aim to provide a historical explanation for how we arrived at this state of affairs. In doing so, he will emphasize the historical context of various philosophers in a way that is not often done in contemporary education. Indeed, one of MacIntyre’s guiding convictions is that philosophy and history must be studied together to understand the full context of ideas and practices. He will also attempt to defeat the idea that morality cannot be rationally argued at all by showing historical examples of robust moral reasoning.
MacIntyre finds three faults with emotivism, which he traces to the early-20th-century philosophy of G. E. Moore. First, its logic is “vacuously circular” because it cannot account for the ultimate reason why we give approval to certain moral acts. Second, it obliterates the distinction between expressions of personal preference and evaluative expressions. Third, it purports to describe the meaning of sentences by reference to feeling or attitude, but feeling or attitude are a function not of the meaning of sentences, but of their use in specific occasions. Ultimately, emotivism does not describe moral language as such but instead merely reflects the specific cultural conditions of Britain in the early-20th century.
MacIntyre stakes an important claim that moral philosophy is always embedded in a social context. He identifies as the key “social content” of emotivism the fact that it obliterates “any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations” (23). Someone operating under the norms of emotivism will seek to manipulate others into agreeing with them instead of using “normative rationality” to make their case.
One way in which emotivism plays out is in the “life of organizations” (25), which are ruled by the bureaucratic ethos. Alluding to the work of the sociologist Max Weber, MacIntyre identifies three representative modern character types: the aesthete, the bureaucratic manager, and the therapist. The aesthete is typically a “rich man committed to the aesthetic pursuit of his own enjoyment” (27) who uses people as means to his (or her) pleasure or amusement. The bureaucratic manager is one who values effectiveness and the smooth running of an institution over ends or moral truth, while the therapist similarly values “psychological effectiveness” over truth.
MacIntyre defends his use of representative characters by asserting that such character types are the social embodiment of a moral philosophy, thus fulfilling his original thesis for the chapter. Thus, we can understand the governing moral philosophy of our time by observing the behavior of these key character types, who put the moral philosophy into action.
In addition, by examining the particular demands of the character types, it is easier to discover that seemingly opposed sides in society really share fundamental assumptions—namely, those of emotivism. This in turn will shed light on how we arrived at the moral deadlock described in Chapter 1. The emergence of the character types is the result of a particular historical evolution, which MacIntyre will trace in the following chapters.
In the first three chapters, MacIntyre establishes the background for his argument. Moral debate today is in a state of confusion owing to particular historical and philosophical developments which he will trace in the book. In Chapter 1, MacIntyre uses an apocalyptic allegory—inspired by the 1960 science fiction novel A Canticle for Leibowitz—to present his thesis. This allegory will connect with his prediction at the very end of the book that “new dark ages” are imminent and that small groups of people must resist this moral decay by forming self-sustaining moral communities. Thus, MacIntyre presents his book as both a warning and a historical account. Throughout After Virtue MacIntyre emphasizes his own belief, based on Aristotle and classical philosophy, that order and rationality should govern society.
In Chapter 2, MacIntyre develops his view of the tendency that he believes characterizes the decline of moral discourse: emotivism. MacIntyre sees the descent of modern society into emotivism as the denial of the rational philosophical tradition going back to ancient Greece. He also sees it as tied in with ahistoricism in the way philosophy is taught: Students are not taught to see ideas in historical and cultural contexts, and so they do not understand where we stand in relation to past ideas and how those ideas have influenced society and culture. Part of MacIntyre’s proposal for reform is to place a greater historical emphasis in the teaching of philosophy so that students will understand that Moral Philosophy Is Socially and Historically Embodied. This emphasis on history will also connect later with his emphasis on the idea that Human Life Is a Story or Narrative.
In fact, MacIntyre follows his own principle in After Virtue by situating moral and philosophical developments in history and society. For example, in Chapter 2 he places the emergence of emotivism within the context of G. E. Moore and the Bloomsbury Group in early-20th-century England—a group of intellectuals who rejected the values of the Victorian era.