49 pages • 1 hour read
Alasdair MacIntyreAfter Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1981A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 10-13Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 10 Summary: “The Virtues in Heroic Societies”
In the societies of the classical and medieval eras, morality was conceived and taught in the form of stories—mythology, poetic epics, or the Bible. People conceived of themselves as members of a society with a particular social role and particular moral and social values. The modern habit of introspection, or mentally stepping back to look at oneself and one’s culture objectively, was unknown to these ancient societies. In the world depicted in Homer’s epics, a person’s identity is tied in with his actions: “a man and his actions become identical” (122). Friends and enemies are sharply defined, and loyalty is prized as the bond of friendship. Heroism and courage—especially on the battlefield—are chief values, and thus MacIntyre chooses the term “heroic society” to describe these cultures (See: Index of Terms).
Thus, in classical societies virtues are embedded in a social structure, so much so that “morality and social structure are in fact one and the same in heroic society” (123, emphasis added)—there is no conception of morality as distinct from social relationships. Moreover, the ethic of classical societies assumes that human life “has a determinate form, the form of a certain kind of story” (124), as reflected in epic poems.
MacIntyre draws some conclusions from these facts. We in the modern era must learn to see morality and the virtues “as part of a tradition” (127) rather than in an abstract sense, and virtues as those things which allow us to perform our role in life. As MacIntyre declares, “we are, whether we acknowledge it or not, what the past has made us” (130). In order to understand how we got from the heroic society to the present day, we must study some intervening periods: MacIntyre will now turn to Aristotle’s period, the age of the Athenian city-state.
Chapter 11 Summary: “The Virtues at Athens”
Although the heroic societies depicted in epic poems may not have actually existed, later generations believed they had and measured their own values against them. One of the most influential classical societies was that of the democratic city-state (polis) of Athens in the time of Aristotle (fifth century BCE). Athenians believed that their city allowed for the highest flourishing of the virtues and showed “human life as it ought to be” (133). In particular, the Athenian system emphasized “cooperative virtues,” one of the most important of which was dikaiosune, or justice as related to the just order of the universe. For Athenians, to be a good human being was equivalent to being a good citizen.
The Olympic games provided a context in which virtues could be practiced and brought Greeks from different city-states together. The concept of contest, or agon (See: Index of Terms), also influenced other areas of Greek culture, including politics, drama, and philosophy. Indeed, all these areas of life were interconnected because they were shaped by the concept of contest and because mostly the same people—all Athenian citizens—participated in all of them.
MacIntyre emphasizes that it is hard to grasp the Athenian view of the virtues because different accounts from the period differ. MacIntyre therefore discusses four different views: Plato, Aristotle, the sophists, and the tragedians, especially Sophocles. His major conclusion is that Aristotle’s view of life was incomplete in that he saw tragedy as being always the result of a moral flaw in individuals. Sophocles, by contrast, understood that tragedy is to some degree part of the natural human condition and can be a source of growth and self-understanding.
The sophists redefined the goal of action as success—thus, the virtues are simply qualities that will ensure success, and sophism developed in the direction of moral relativism. Due to these inherent contradictions, sophism was rejected by Plato.
Chapter 12 Summary: “Aristotle’s Account of the Virtues”
MacIntyre seeks to depict Aristotle as a link in a tradition of thought about the virtues; he points out that this is an idea foreign to Aristotle himself, who regarded his own thought as comprehensive and definitive.
Aristotle’s best-known account of the virtues is contained in the Nichomachean Ethics, a set of lecture notes that has become one of the most famous of all moral treatises. The book represents the ethical views of the educated Athenian as being the best and highest way of life. The starting point is the idea that human beings have a “specific nature” and a telos embodying “certain aims and goals” (148) which are equivalent to the good. The goal or good of humans is eudaimonia, or happiness, and the virtues are “those qualities the possession of which will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia” (148).
However, rather than being a mere means to an end, the virtues are “a necessary and central part” of “a complete human life lived at its best” (149). To act virtuously is “to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues” (149). The virtuous life is lived in community with others, and to act in an unvirtuous manner harms the whole community. In addition, virtue is inseparably connected with practical intelligence (phronesis), which tells one how to act in particular situations.
From this harmonious classical conception of the good and virtue, it follows that humans are perfectible. Tragedy and conflict are due to flaws in human nature—a view shared by both Aristotle and Plato. With these philosophers, MacIntyre argues, the concept of agon (See: Index of Terms) has been displaced from its centrality in Greek thought. Sophocles and the dramatists represent a different view. For Sophocles, tragedy and conflict are basic, ineradicable elements of human life and can teach us truths about our nature. In the following chapters, MacIntyre will take up this theme and argue that conflict is embodied in traditions and narratives about human life.
Chapter 13 Summary: “Medieval Aspects and Occasions”
Medieval society inherited aspects of both heroic society and classical society. The moral code of many medieval societies, such as those of the Anglo-Saxons and Vikings, prioritized honor, loyalty, and revenge. At the same time, Christian theologians started to reflect on how to reconcile the classical virtues with Christianity.
The major adjustment that was made was to define morality as conformity of the will with a universal moral law—not just the moral code of a particular locality like the city-state. Moreover, Christianity now added the concept of sin, or breach of divine law, to the Greek concept of character flaw, and emphasized the will as the center of moral action.
After the ancient period, Stoicism continued to influence Christian thinkers in a variety of ways. Its emphasis on perfecting the will and following the moral law tended to eliminate any consideration of a telos; this would lead modern thinkers in a similar direction. Furthermore, Stoicism tended to regard virtue as singular (a “simple monism of virtue” [169]) instead of a hierarchical ordering of separate virtues; this too is reflected in the deemphasis on virtues in modern thought.
Finally, the replacement of the Greek city-state with the Macedonian kingdom and the Roman Empire encouraged Stoic thinkers to conceive virtue as individual rather than a shared good in the community. In all these ways, MacIntyre argues that Stoicism lies at the root of modern post-Aristotelian ethics. However, the Jewish conception of morality as law, as absorbed in Christianity, was also a factor that led in the direction of deontology.
In the Middle Ages, thinkers tried to reconcile “law ethics” (as reflected in the Jewish Old Testament) with “virtue ethics” (as reflected in classical philosophy). In particular, medieval thinkers like Alan of Lille reconceived the virtues as solutions to political problems, such as that of creating and sustaining institutions of learning and culture as Europe emerged from the Dark Ages.
Christian virtue ethics, however, differed from Aristotle’s in some important ways. For Aristotle, being unvirtuous was a failing, whereas Christianity added the concept of sin and evil and emphasized the consent of the will. Virtues became qualities that enable the human subject to overcome evils that bar the way to achieving the good. For Aristotle, certain circumstances of life—like low birth—can exclude one from eudaimonia, whereas for Christianity no one is excluded by such external circumstances.
Christianity added to Aristotle’s scheme virtues such as humility and divided the virtues into four “cardinal” and three “theological” virtues. Finally, the Christian view of ethics has a new, historical perspective that Aristotle lacked: Christian thinkers saw ethical choices and human life itself as taking place against the background of time and a “historical journey” towards the Second Coming of Jesus.
Chapters 10-13 Analysis
These four chapters delve deeply into the classical and medieval history of virtue theory. In treating these periods together, MacIntyre creates a strong contrast with modern moral thought and practice, thus strengthening his “Aristotle versus Nietzsche” thesis. Also in this section, MacIntyre brings his idea that Human Life Is a Story or Narrative to the fore. In all periods where classical thought formed the basis of society, moral education took place through storytelling. This is significant for MacIntyre because it highlights the fact that the classical world saw life itself as a narrative marked by moral choices, while suggesting that Morality Is Ultimately About Character.
MacIntyre’s discussion of heroic society also underlines his central idea that Moral Philosophy Is Socially and Historically Embodied. In heroic society, morality was quite simply the manifestation of “social fact,” and it was closely tied in with practices or specific activities in which virtues played a role. In essence, practicing the correct virtue is the way to “play the game” of life and take one’s place within society. MacIntyre argues that this whole conception of virtue has been lost in modern times, wherein society is governed according to managerial rather than moral norms and there is little or no normative role for the virtues.
By the time of Aristotle, Greece had passed beyond the ethical code of the Homeric era, but the virtues of the earlier period continued to inform morality for ages to come. MacIntyre conducts a close analysis of Aristotle’s scheme of virtues in Chapter 12, then in Chapter 13 examines how medieval culture was alternatively influenced by Aristotle and by new social conditions.
The fact that MacIntyre critiques some aspects of St. Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics is notable. MacIntyre finds Aquinas’s classification suspiciously tidy and consistent, neglecting the often-arbitrary, empirical way we learn virtues in the real world. MacIntyre’s explicit questioning of Aquinas might be seen as daring, but in doing so he follows his own stated principle that traditions thrive on internal criticism.
