After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory

MacIntyre proposes that we understand the failure of the Enlightenment philosophers as due not to their inability to form a good enough argument, but rather in their shared formation in a particular culture and “scheme of moral beliefs” (51) that was fundamentally flawed. In particular, there was a discrepancy between their “shared conception of moral rules” (52) and their general conception of human nature, which had changed from the Aristotelian beliefs that prevailed before the Enlightenment.

In Aristotle’s system of ethics, man is conceived as a being with an essential nature and a telos, or end, along with definite roles to play in life. Aristotle contrasted man as he presently is with man as he could be if he realized his telos. Thus, the virtues help man to achieve his end of happiness or eudaimonia (See: Index of Terms). These are precisely the elements of Aristotelianism rejected by Enlightenment thought, which asserted that reason was powerless to explain being itself and could arrive only at “truths of fact and mathematical relations” (54). The principle “no ‘ought’ conclusion from ‘is’ premises” (59) expressed the new skepticism that man had a fixed nature that prescribed particular actions. In this way, it now seemed implausible to “treat moral judgments as factual statements” (59)—they had to be founded in feeling instead of reason.

Thus, in seeking to provide a rational basis for moral rules, the new thinkers were engaging in an “inevitably unsuccessful project” (55). There was a cognitive dissonance between the traditional moral rules they wanted to justify and the new conception of human nature that eliminated the telos. This was compounded by their bias for their own “peculiar historical and cultural situation” (55) and “deep lack of historical consciousness” (59), which led them to the mistaken belief that they were discussing morality in an objective and impartial manner.

However, this philosophical shift was regarded by thinkers at the time as a liberation of the self from the shackles of a “theistic and teleological world order” with its oppressive “hierarchical structures” (60). Indeed, the emergence of the individual as a concept is a signal achievement of this period of thought. MacIntyre will discuss this new concept in the following chapter.

MacIntyre now considers the course of philosophical ethics in the wake of the Enlightenment. The major achievement of this period was a new conception of the individual as a moral agent, “sovereign in his moral authority” (62). The first major step in this direction was the philosophy of utilitarianism, especially prevalent in Britain and represented by Jeremy Bentham and, later, John Stuart Mill.

Bentham argued that the basis for morality was the desire to experience pleasure and avoid pain. Bentham’s disciple, Mill, expanded his system to include a fuller definition of pleasure and happiness. Utilitarianism, like the Enlightenment moral project, fails because its idea of happiness is limited and its governing ideal of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” (64) is a vague idea without clear content.

In MacIntyre’s analysis, utilitarianism was succeeded by intuitionism and pragmatism, and then by emotivism, each going further in disregarding the virtues as moral norms. However, parallel to this, 20th-century analytical philosophy sought to uphold the rationality of moral rules rooted in the thought of Kant, even though society as a whole was moving toward emotivism. Thus, MacIntyre considers utilitarianism important as a historical link between the Enlightenment and modern emotivism.

MacIntyre identifies three other key modern moral concepts: rights, protest, and unmasking. These concepts have become popular in modern times because they fill the void created by the absence of rational argument. The concept of “rights” came into the languages of Europe in the late Middle Ages and became central during the Enlightenment, when attention was drawn to the “natural rights” of man. According to MacIntyre, rights are a useful “fiction” whose existence has never been demonstrated. Protest is a favored activity in modern society because it expresses indignation at perceived infringement of rights. Unmasking consists of exposing the “motives of arbitrary will and desire” (72) that allegedly lie behind human actions, given that moral rules are now understood in irrational terms.

Since moral vocabulary is employed without truly rational or moral content, MacIntyre concludes that modern morality is mostly a “theatre of illusions” (77).