46 pages • 1 hour read
B. F. SkinnerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Autonomous man is a euphemism for free will. Skinner elaborates that autonomous man arises from ignorance, that he functions to explain the yet-unexplainable: “He initiates, originates, and creates, and in doing so he remains, as he was for the Greeks, divine. We say that he is autonomous—and, so far as a science of behavior is concerned, that means miraculous” (14).
Skinner refutes free will or autonomous man. Instead, he argues for behavioral determinism, which is a subsect of determinism, or the philosophical view that every event is caused by preceding and environmental factors. While modern behavioral determinism generally recognizes the importance of internal states such as thoughts and emotions on behavior, Skinner rejects this in favor of a psychological behaviorist approach. He demands behavioral evidence and regards internal states as irrelevant by-products. While humanity has operated on the assumption that autonomous man exists, Skinner claims that by rejecting free will and accepting behavioral determinism, humans can act to correct humanitarian and environmental issues.
Chapters 2 through 5 examine how autonomous man has resulted in the destructive and inhibitory concepts of freedom, dignity, punishments, and other socially acceptable methods of behavioral control. Skinner presents these as imagined and reliant on free will: Freedom holds that people should have the right to utilize their free will; dignity implies people are worthy of credit because of their utilization of free will; and punishment and its alternatives assume that, since people have free will, they are accountable for their behavior.
Each of these concepts is refuted through behavioral determinism. Freedom is negated through the idea that all behavior is determined; the illusion of freedom arises through obscured or invisible causes of behavior. Dignity then becomes irrelevant; if all behavior is caused by antecedent or environmental causes, then no one deserves credit. Similarly, punishment is illogical, as behavioral determinism posits that people are not responsible for behavior and thus should not be punished.
Skinner revisits the dichotomy between behavioral determinism and autonomous man in the final chapter and examines what it means to be a human. He reiterates that autonomous man appears through ignorance, and explores the implications of behavioral determinism. He extends his conversation beyond free will into consciousness. Free will and consciousness are often inextricably linked, with free will relating to supposed autonomy and consciousness being functionally defined as self-awareness. Skinner claims that consciousness is not inherent to living beings, but a social construct specific to humans: “Consciousness is a social product. It is not only not the special field of autonomous man, it is not within range of a solitary man” (192).
While critics of behavioral determinism and supporters of free will may argue that these ideas are pessimistic or cold, Skinner finds hope in behavioral determinism, arguing that it is the key to long-term human survival.
This theme emerges in the first chapter and is used to support both the refutation of free will and to argue that intentional cultural manipulation is critical. Skinner opens his text by directly addressing some of the most prominent social issues of the time—the majority of which are still prevalent in modern society. Through his discussion, he identifies how modern scientific advancements have created social problems:
But things grow steadily worse, and it is disheartening to find that technology itself is increasingly at fault. Sanitation and medicine have made the problems of population more acute, war has acquired a new horror with the invention of nuclear weapons, and the affluent pursuit of happiness is largely responsible for pollution (3).
Skinner suggests humanity should emphasize a technology of behavior. This would utilize determinism and behaviorism to better understand human behavior and design a culture to reduce or eradicate social and environmental ills.
Along with eliminating problems like overpopulation and war, Skinner promotes a scientific approach to achieve objectivity. Behavior-related science is particularly prone to subjectivity and bias, as those studying behavior are unavoidably close to the research field. As such, sciences that relate to behavior have been heavily influenced by the subjective thoughts and emotions of the scientists and philosophers performing the research. Skinner warns: “The ease with which mentalist explanations can be invented on the spot is perhaps the best gauge of how little attention we should pay to them” (160).
Skinner’s method of proving his argument relies on his analysis. A potential critique is that this lacks objectivity and arises from the yet-to-be-met need for a scientific approach to social problems. By writing the text and promoting his views, Skinner calls for objectivity in behavioral science as it relates to social problems while remaining subjective at the same time.
Skinner argues that it is more ethical to intentionally control behavior than not. He asserts that freedom and dignity are illusions that arise through the concept of autonomous man and through literature of freedom and dignity. Such literature—which he alludes to vaguely with few specific examples—declares that the obstruction of freedom and dignity is immoral. Skinner counters, suggesting freedom and dignity are more harmful than beneficial. These concepts are presented as central to US culture, which is known for its emphasis on individualism.
Skinner presents individualism as antithetical to ethics. He claims that ethics emerge through values for the good of others and cultural values. Similarly, Skinner denounces punishment as unethical. Punishment, he argues, is a behavioral control method that relies on free will to hold individuals accountable for their behaviors. A more ethical option would be to design a culture in which people are innately good, eliminating the need for punishment. Skinner asserts: “When we make the world less punishing or teach people how to avoid natural punishments, as by giving them rules to follow, we are not destroying responsibility or threatening any other occult quality. We are simply making the world safer” (74). Thus, avoiding punishment is one of the most significant ethical implications of behavioral modification.
Skinner calls for intentionally designed cultures. Intentional behavioral modification is viewed by many as unethical, as it impinges on the so-called individual right to freedom. Skinner refutes this view, asserting that is it more ethical to purposefully attempt to solve social and environmental problems. He connects the concepts of cultural and biological evolution. While the comparative discussion mainly examines the similarities between the processes, it draws a more ethically significant conclusion: “The designer of a culture is not an interloper or meddler. He does not step in to disturb a natural process, he is part of a natural process” (180). In other words, intentionally modifying behavior is not unethical because humans naturally develop the capacity to do so through biological evolution.