Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming

Much of the Tobacco Strategy examined within this narrative—used by the merchants of doubt, industries, and the government alike—concerns the powerful nature that uncertainty can have in questioning the proposed truth of scientific evidence. By its nature, science is uncertain, as it only provides the evidence for assumed conclusions. In many cases, the merchants of doubt capitalized on the uncertain nature of science to disavow conclusions they did not agree with. They used the logic of the 19th century positivists, who believed in the absolute truth of positive knowledge. When they examined the evidence based on this assumption, they compelled the public to believe that the evidence was in question: “We think that science provides certainty, so if we lack certainty, we think the science must be faulty or incomplete” (267).

However, it is in the nature of science—and in truth, of knowledge—to be incomplete. Science can never explain the full picture, as new scientific evidence is always coming to light, and changing previous assumptions:“History shows us clearly that science does not provide certainty….It only provides the consensus of experts, based on the organized accumulation and scrutiny of evidence” (270). It is this expert consensus, not the certainty of evidence, that is important in terms of scientific knowledge.

Part of the problem with the uncertainty of science involved the fact that mainstream scientists also used scientific uncertainty to push for government regulation. In the case of the ozone hole, little was known at first about its cause or if it would get bigger, leading many environmentalists to push for both a coordinated research plan as well as government intervention:

While almost no one lived within the boundaries of the depleted region, if it grew very much, it would reach populated landmasses in Australia and South America. And since no one knew the mechanism that produced the hole, no one could be certain that it would not grow (120).

In this way, it appeared as though the merchants of doubt were using the same uncertainty constantly present in science, but merely reaching a different conclusion. Because the merchants of doubt were scientists, they knew that scientific uncertainty was natural within the discovery of knowledge. By knowing this, they created the appearance of an alternative conclusion based upon the evidence. However, they cherry-picked and misused data to misrepresent the true uncertainties evident within these arguments, often using uncertainty to claim that there was no problem whatsoever, despite a wealth of evidence that suggested otherwise. Simply, they knew how to manipulate the scientific nature of uncertainty in their favor, casting much doubt on the presence of environmental issues that still exist today.

However, these merchants of doubt also used certainty to counteract the cautious uncertainty of environmentalists, especially in the case of Reagan’s SDI program. They insisted on the certainty of a lack of evidence, maintaining that the lack of evidence of Soviet military hegemony was cause for its certainty: “While the tobacco industry had tried to exploit uncertainties where the science was firm, these men insisted on certainties where the evidence was thin or entirely absent” (42).

Essentially, they created certainty out of thin air, using fear to achieve their political aims. Where there was no evidence to support their claims, they insisted on the certainty that it had to be there; scientists just hadn’t encountered it yet. This was a completely opposite approach from how they attacked environmental issues, as they insisted in the uncertainty of the science. In this way, the merchants of doubt manipulated the ideas of scientific uncertainty and certainty to prevent government regulation on environmental issues and advance their political agendas.