64 pages • 2 hours read
Francis BaconNovum Organum
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1620A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Book 1, Aphorisms 38-77Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Book 1, Aphorisms 38-68 Summary
In this section, Bacon describes four “idols”—sources of flawed thinking that harm humanity’s quest for knowledge. He warns that they must be guarded against during the “instauration.” Aphorisms 41-44 briefly introduce each idol, and subsequent sections expand upon them individually, including examples of them.
Aphorisms 45-52 elaborate on the “Idols of the tribe,” or innate human fallibility. Bacon gives examples, such as the tendency to jump to conclusions in excitement or the inclination to look for order or patterns in things where there might not be any—for instance, trying to impose perfect circles onto astronomical orbits.
Aphorisms 53-58 elaborate on the “Idols of the den”—the individual’s particular flaws and biases, whether innate to the person or arising from external influence. An example is how some people are inclined to primarily look to the past, specifically antiquity, while some are too blinkered in looking forward toward novelty; few manage to balance these perspectives.
Aphorisms 59-60 expand on the “Idols of the marketplace,” which are the errors that arise in human communication, including confusion or deception. Bacon asserts that words not only communicate human thoughts but also shape them, being the medium in which thoughts are formed. He specifically mentions “names,” or nouns, describing how they can give a misleading impression of what something actually is.
Aphorisms 61-65 expand on the “Idols of the theatre”: the errors disseminated by existing philosophies and systems of study. Bacon divides these into three subcategories and gives examples of which philosophers have disseminated each kind. Aristotle is an example of sophism, categorized by too much emphasis on theoretical thought with little attention to physical evidence. Alchemists and Gilbert are examples of empiricism, categorized by diligent practical focus on only a narrow topic from which they draw large conclusions. Plato, Pythagoras, and unnamed modern scholars are examples of superstition. Bacon includes in this category mixing Christian theology with scientific enquiry—a practice Bacon condemns.
Bacon then criticizes the “faulty subjects” studied in these various disciplines. Firstly, focusing on “mechanical arts” has produced the theory of the elements making up larger bodies. Secondly, studying broad categories in nature—plants, animals, minerals—has produced the theory that nature favors certain patterns while errors produce anything outside those patterns, leading to interest in occult or extraordinary powers. Instead, humanity should study the qualities of things and the forces that act between objects.
However, Bacon criticizes current investigations of forces, such as motion, as overly simplistic in describing their action rather than their deeper causes. Bacon gives examples of his own observations about motion, which he says are specific and meaningful. He also states that many investigations are too abstract and huge to be relevant to humanity (such as topics related to atoms), whereas intermediate things are more immediately useful.
Finally, Bacon cautions against intemperance, comparing the two extremes of dogmatism and skepticism, which he illustrates via Aristotle and Plato, respectively. Bacon concludes his description of the idols by stressing the importance of clearing the mind of these things to start from a blank slate when studying science.
Book 1, Aphorisms 69-70 Summary
Bacon moves on to discuss “demonstrations”: the process through which scholars seek to prove their ideas. He observes that if the demonstration is flawed, so too will any resulting idea or conclusion be flawed. He says that demonstrations often embody the four idols he has outlined and singles out demonstrations of logic as subjugating people to thoughts, and those thoughts to the constraints of language. He describes the flaws embedded in current ways of working from a starting point of sensory evidence to demonstrate how an axiom has been reached—for example, a lack of acknowledgement that the senses themselves can be misleading.
In Aphorism 70, Bacon asserts that experience is the best demonstration and can be found through experiment; however, current experimentation is not carried out well. It is often too unfocused and random, without specific enough aims. Alternatively, some people focus deeply on one subject in isolation—for example, Gilbert’s studies on magnets or the alchemists’ experiments with gold. Bacon argues that you cannot learn about anything in isolation from everything else. Lastly, people often skip ahead too fast to seeking a practical application of their experiments, pursuing material profit at the expense of an end goal. Bacon suggests that in their demonstrations, humans should instead imitate God and ascertain one thing fully at a time, just as God reserved the entire first day for light before introducing anything material. Bacon suggests this will achieve more in the long run, as slowly and methodically establishing small axioms will eventually open expansive doors.
Bacon concludes by saying that he will now use demonstration himself to prove that current approaches to knowledge are flawed. He will do this by recounting the various “external signs of the weakness […] [in] received systems” so that people will be more receptive to his way of thinking and will clear their minds of the idols more easily (22).
Book 1, Aphorisms 71-77 Summary
Bacon lists and explains observations that he deems “signs” of the poor state of current philosophical and scientific thought. The first sign is the place of its origin—Greece. Although the ancient Greeks got some things right, he says, Greek approaches to knowledge were seriously flawed—particularly the approaches of later scholars whose works supplanted those of their predecessors. He refers again to the Sophist school and to dogmatism and says that unfortunately the better ideas have not flourished, as light things travel more easily through history than heavy or complex things. He cites an Egyptian priest who said the Greeks were like children: overly talkative but incapable of generating anything.
The next sign is that these philosophies originated very early in human history, which represents a weakness, as there was less history to inform them, and people knew much less of the world physically and geographically.
Bacon’s next sign is that these philosophies have borne few fruits. Few experiments have helped humankind or have even meaningfully supported their assertions. He says that animals make more new discoveries through their brute interaction with nature then humans have managed through discursive and abstract approaches to reasoning. Even practical types of study (such as alchemists, mechanics, and magicians) have had very limited success, and this more through chance than because of a sound underpinning philosophy. Bacon suggests that comparing rates of progress can show how sound an approach is. Philosophical and scientific systems founded on nature (for example, the mechanical arts) do better than those based on opinion.
Bacon’s next sign is that people within the existing epistemological system complain frequently about things being unknowable simply because their system has not discovered it. Bacon deems this skepticism unhelpful to progress. He gives examples of ideas falling into this category, such as the theory that because the sun is a different type of heat from fire, it cannot be investigated successfully.
He next returns to epistemological history, describing how there were many competing ideas and systems in the past. In some areas, consensus is now reached, but not in others, and the existence of so many schools of thought shows that none can be taken seriously, as otherwise one would rise above the rest. He anticipates that some might describe Aristotelianism this way, but he argues that many other systems continued to exist long after the advent of Aristotelianism and were only destroyed following the collapse of the Roman Empire. Subsequently, people conformed to Aristotelianism due to biases and deference to authority. Bacon then adds that unanimity isn’t a reason to trust something anyway, as one should always distrust what the multitudes think. He concludes that all the signs point toward the poor state of received wisdoms.
Book 1, Aphorisms 38-77 Analysis
In this section of Novum Organum Bacon develops the theme of The Flawed Foundations of Existing Epistemology. He presents two major strands here: the flawed nature of humanity itself, which makes people prone to error (explored in his four idols), and the observations that he cites as evidence of the poor state of current scientific enquiry.
In presenting the four idols, Bacon examines human behavior and ways of thinking—what might now be called psychology and sociology. For example, he asserts that “human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things than it really finds” and that this is why people were inclined to think that celestial bodies move in circles (13). This foreshadows the modern concept in evolutionary psychology that humans are pattern-seeking. This is an example of one of Bacon’s “idols of the tribe”: traits that he considers innate and universal parts of human nature. These innate traits are the reason why a tool is needed (his “new organon,” as part of his proposed great instauration) for proper investigation—humans need an external aid to overcome their inherent flaws.
In the “idols of the den,” Bacon considers biases that are specific to particular people, incorporating both individual tendencies and formative environmental factors. The debate of nature versus nurture is a massive topic in modern science, psychology, and sociology. However, it was a point of discussion in Elizabethan England too, with Shakespeare juxtaposing the two terms in The Tempest, first performed in 1611 (Act IV, Scene 1). Bacon argues that people have biases springing from both “the peculiar nature of each individual’s mind and body, and also from education, habit, and accident” (15)—in other words, a combination of nature and nurture.
His “idols of the market” address the imperfect nature of human communication, as it relies on language, which can be deceptive, vague, or misunderstood. Here, he interacts with an ongoing philosophical interest in language’s meaning and function, which continues today but dates back to at least Ancient Greece, where figures such as Plato explicitly explored the role of language. Bacon argues that “men imagine that their reason governs words, while, in fact, words react upon the understanding” (16): He asserts that words do not just reflect our thoughts but also shape them. His emphasis on precise and methodical use of language as part of his proposed epistemological reform fits in with this idea. For example, on Page 51, he ensures that he has carefully defined what the word “form” will signify in the context of his method before moving forward.
Bacon spends by far the most time exploring the “idols of the theatre,” by which he means existing epistemological traditions and schools. He assigns this name because, just like a story presented on a stage, these traditions may have no truth to them: They enjoy status simply by virtue of their existence rather than because they have been thoroughly assessed. Bacon divides this topic into “three sources of error and three species of false philosophy; the sophistic, empiric, and superstitious” (18), allowing him to give tailored arguments against the perceived faults of each and to single out specific figures as examples of these movements (such as Aristotle, Gilbert, and Plato, though Aristotle did not consider himself a sophist).
Bacon backs up these arguments by presenting a collection of observations that he designates “signs of the weakness […] of the received systems of philosophy and contemplation which we referred to above” (22). As Bacon criticizes overreliance on words without tangible evidence, presenting observations in support of his intellectual arguments is important according to his own criteria. For example, having criticized the theoretical approach of the sophists of ancient Greece earlier in Aphorism 63, Bacon now observes that few of their findings have any practical applicability: “[S]carcely one single experiment can be culled that has a tendency to elevate or assist mankind, and can be fairly set down to the speculations and doctrines of their philosophy” (24).
Similarly, when examining the “idols of the theatre,” Bacon compares Aristotle unfavorably to some of his contemporaries, citing the ideas of Anaxagoras, Leucippus and Democritus, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Heraclitus, who “exhibit some sprinkling of natural philosophy, the nature of things, and experiment” where Aristotle does not (18). Bacon then develops this into an observation that supports the importance of using evidence: “[T]hose which are founded on nature grow and increase, while those which are founded on opinion change and increase not” (24).
As well as citing history in favor of his arguments, Bacon also invokes the words of other authorities. He says that “Celsus candidly and wisely” notes the importance of induction “when he observes that experiments were first discovered in medicine, and that men afterward built their philosophical systems upon them” (24). He describes how “the Egyptians (who bestowed divinity and sacred honors on the authors of new inventions) […] consecrated more images of brutes than of men” because “men derived [so few discoveries] from discussion and the conclusions of reason” (24). He therefore bolsters his own assertions by appealing to the observations of others.
He even cites those he disagrees with: “the actual confession of those very authorities whom men now follow” (24). He describes how they “betake themselves to complaints about the subtility of nature, the obscurity of things, and the weakness of man’s wit” (24), arguing that if things appear unknowable to them, then their methods clearly don’t work. This is an example of the persuasive rhetoric Bacon uses throughout Novum Organum but particularly in Book 1, co-opting the alleged arguments of those he is attacking in favor of his own points. To the extent that he misrepresents his opponents’ arguments for this purpose, this is an example of the “straw man” rhetorical technique. For example, Bacon criticizes “the New Academy, which openly professed scepticism, and consigned mankind to eternal darkness” (25), but the New Academy would not necessarily have aligned itself with outright skepticism.
Bacon therefore uses a range of techniques, including presenting his own observations as evidence and using persuasive rhetoric, to argue that “[a]ll the signs […] of the truth and soundness of the received systems of philosophy and the sciences are unpropitious, whether taken from their origin, their fruits, their progress, the confessions of their authors, or from unanimity” (26). This establishes the necessity of Bacon’s own intervention.
