64 pages • 2 hours read
Francis BaconNovum Organum
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1620A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Themes
The Flawed Foundations of Existing Epistemology
A major theme in the Novum Organum is the flawed foundations of epistemology in Bacon’s time. He presents existing approaches to science and philosophy as riddled with problems due to their historical roots and argues that they therefore require enormous change. Book 1 is the main vehicle for this, but the theme also features in Book 2, in which it is a counterpoint to his own suggestions.
Bacon argues that there are “three sources of error and three species of false philosophy; the sophistic, empiric, and superstitious” (18). He associates sophism, as a school of teaching, with a dogmatic attitude and an approach revolving around “disputatious” verbal argument that “entraps the understanding” (19), all of which is inimical to true scientific enquiry. His primary example of sophism is the “impure and corrupted” approach of Aristotelian logic (36). Central to this is the syllogism, in which axioms, or statements asserted to be true, are used to create further axioms. Bacon traces this form of reasoning through medieval Scholasticism to his contemporaries, identifying it as a central factor in damaging the pursuit of knowledge.
Bacon locates the central flaw in the Aristotelian approach in its tendency to retroactively impose theories onto observations rather than derive theories from observations, as in his own approach: “We are wont, for the sake of distinction, to call that human reasoning which we apply to nature the anticipation of nature (as being rash and premature), and that which is properly deduced from things the interpretation of nature” (10). Although Bacon uses the word “deduced” in this second definition, he is using it in a generalized sense, and this statement actually reflects his overall argument in favor of induction rather than deduction. This means that he advocates starting with observations, producing small conclusions from these and working up to large theories. By contrast, deductive reasoning starts with a theory that it then tests to produce evidence (detailed in Aphorism 19). Bacon criticizes this on the grounds that it does not account for the natural human inclination to force one’s observations to fit the theory: “The human understanding, when any proposition has been once laid down […] forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation” (13). This would eventually become known as confirmation bias.
However, Bacon does not consider himself an empiricist, associating this school with overly narrow observation: “The empiric school produces dogmas of a more deformed and monstrous nature [being founded] in the confined obscurity of a few experiments” (28). Bacon insists that context is vital to any scientific understanding, asserting that “nobody can successfully investigate the nature of any object by considering that object alone; the inquiry must be more generally extended” (22). He cites Gilbert’s interest in the magnet and the alchemists’ in gold as current examples of this limited focus.
In Bacon’s third main branch of “false philosophy,” superstition, he includes “fantastical” ideas (non-Christian religious or mythical frameworks), giving Pythagoras and Plato as examples of where a “fanciful, bombastic, and, as it were, poetical school” has impinged on scientific enquiry (19). However, Bacon also includes attempts to bring Christianity (the mainstream, state religion of Jacobean England) into scientific enquiry under the umbrella of superstition. Clarifying that his critique is not of Christianity per se, he argues that this blending damages science and religion alike: “[N]ot only fantastical philosophy, but heretical religion spring from the absurd mixture of matters divine and human. It is therefore most wise soberly to render unto faith the things that are faith’s” (19). Bacon urges that religion and science be kept separate (though he also suggests that the pursuit of knowledge is an intrinsically godly endeavor).
Bacon examines the history of epistemology to offer evidence that these three false philosophies don’t work, dedicating a whole section of Novum Organum to the “external signs of the weakness in practice of the received systems of philosophy and contemplation” (22). For example, he notes that many important inventions in human life, such as bread, beer, and the alphabet, predate (purportedly) rigorous philosophical and scientific enquiry. The implication is that current approaches are so flawed that they are no better than chance in producing innovation.
Bacon also offers explanations as to why epistemology has developed in such a flawed way, dedicating a section beginning in Aphorism 78 to this. For example, he argues that humanity has not had much time to develop its knowledge of the world: “[O]ut of twenty-five centuries, with which the memory and learning of man are conversant, scarcely six can be set apart and selected as fertile in science and favorable to its progress” (26). Bacon also identifies four “idols” that plague human thinking. The idols refer to the ways that humans are prone to bias and include innate human fallibility (“the idols of the tribe”), formative external experiences (“idols of the den”), the imperfection of human communication (“idols of the marketplace”), and the influence of existing philosophies and authorities (“idols of the theatre”). Aphorisms 38-68 expand on these.
Bacon’s criticisms of existing approaches to the pursuit of knowledge therefore range from attacking specific schools of thought to critiquing human nature itself. He uses Novum Organum to “declare it necessary to destroy completely the vain, little and, as it were, apish imitations of the world, which have been formed in various systems of philosophy by men’s fancies” (47). He argues that the current system must be discarded and replaced by a system that acknowledges the gulf between human understanding and nature.
Conviction in Human Progress Through the Pursuit of Knowledge
Despite Bacon’s denigration of existing epistemology and his assertion of human fallibility, a belief in both the importance of and potential for human progress permeates Novum Organum. He opposes approaches that assert that knowledge is “beyond man’s reach” (25), arguing that they are useless and pessimistic: “[T]he New Academy, which openly professed scepticism, […] consigned mankind to eternal darkness” (25).
In fact, he argues that his criticisms are a reason to hope rather than despair, as the issues he highlights exist within human systems rather than within the nature of basic reality: “[T]he difficulty does not arise from things themselves, which are not in our power, but from the human understanding, its practice and application, which is susceptible of remedy and correction” (36). Bacon here echoes the humanist idea, which gained traction in the Renaissance, that humanity has enormous potential for betterment. He refutes the skeptics’ claim that things are unknowable: The fact that the existing inadequate means have yielded any discoveries at all shows this is not true. He suggests that if humans have learned things without proper methodology, they will learn even more with the proper tools: New knowledge “will doubtless be brought to light in the course and lapse of years, as the others have been before them; but in the way we now point out, they may rapidly and at once be both represented and anticipated” (40).
He therefore has great hope “many excellent and useful matters are yet treasured up in the bosom of nature” (40), and these are what he aims to unlock. Doing so is worthwhile in part because some of these “matters” may have practical use to humanity in the form of inventions. He asserts that “the introduction of great inventions appears one of the most distinguished of human actions […] for the benefits derived from inventions may extend to mankind in general” (50). These benefits last forever and can only do good for humanity with no ill effects: “a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any” (50). This concern for the betterment of the human condition again echoes Renaissance humanist thought, and Bacon uses it to motivate interest in his proposals, offering an ethical argument for them (increasing human happiness) and a personal incentive (the honor due to those who work toward this).
However, Bacon also stresses that regardless of material benefits, pursuing his method is an honorable activity: “[T]he contemplation of things as they are, free from superstition or imposture, error or confusion, [is] much more dignified in itself than all the advantage to be derived from discoveries” (50). He promises personal satisfaction to those who understand this: When experiments are conducted from pure scientific curiosity, all results are worthwhile because they increase one’s knowledge. This is an important promise to potential disciples because his approach will not necessarily produce groundbreaking inventions immediately due to its painstaking methodology.
As well as being valuable to humanity and rewarding for the individual, Bacon also argues that material and intellectual progress are fundamentally linked, again suggesting that patience in pursuing his methodology will be worth it. He asserts that, “Knowledge and human power are synonymous, since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect; […] that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause in practical science becomes the rule” (9). He thus suggests that the understanding gained through his method will give humans great power over world. In his chosen example of heat in Book 2, for example, he equates theoretical and practical definitions: Should someone recreate the terms of his definition, “[Y]ou will beyond all doubt produce heat” (77).
Bacon also reassures any critics that pursuing such potent knowledge is morally sound and in line with contemporary religious thought:
[A]ny one who properly considers the subject will find natural philosophy to be […] the most approved support of faith. She is, therefore, rightly bestowed upon religion as a most faithful attendant, for the one exhibits the will and the other the power of God (33).
Bacon here suggests that scientific pursuits are not merely permitted according to Christianity but in fact godly, as they throw light on the wonders of God’s creation and utilize humanity’s God-given potential. This is also presented as another reason to hope for upcoming progress; such progress has divine endorsement and was even biblically prophesied in Daniel’s prophecy that “[m]any shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased” (35). Bacon interprets this to mean that knowledge will flourish in the same era that the globe is circumnavigated, something that happened in the previous century.
Bacon dedicates a whole section of the Novum Organum to offering these reasons why humanity should have hope for the future (starting at Book 1, Aphorism 93). He explains that hope is an important motivator: “[T}he manifestation of hope [is necessary] to encourage activity [and] quicken the industry of experiment” (35). His optimistic outlook on both the value of human progress and its likelihood is therefore a crucial part of Novum Organum, as it is the founding ideal behind his “Great Instauration.”
An Inductive Approach to Knowledge
Bacon presents the work’s first two major themes in service of the third: his own proposal. Having argued that existed epistemology is flawed and that the pursuit of knowledge is important for human progress, Bacon presents the natural conclusion to this: a new approach. He calls this “The Great Instauration,” or the great renewal.
He explains that this must not be based on existing ways of thinking but must be completely fresh: “It is in vain to expect any great progress in the sciences by the superinducing or ingrafting new matters upon old. An instauration must be made from the very foundations, if we do not wish to revolve forever in a circle” (11). He says that his method is wholly unique—it is one that “none can venture to affirm to have been already done or even thought of” (37)—therefore meeting the criteria he has given.
He introduces the structure of the method early in Book 1, using his exploration of the first two themes to argue in favor of “genuine induction,” which he defines in Aphorism 19. He specifies that his approach is different from both a logic-based approach and what he calls an empiric approach:
Our course and method, however (as we have often said, and again repeat), is such as not to deduce effects from effects, nor experiments from experiments (as the empirics do), but in our capacity of legitimate interpreters of nature, to deduce causes and axioms from effects and experiments; and new effects and experiments from those causes and axioms (43).
Baconian method, he suggests, will create a fertile cycle of new exploration.
In Book 2, Bacon outlines three main steps that must be taken in the “Great Instauration.” First, an account of everything—“a complete and accurate natural and experimental history” (56)—must be compiled. Because this will be an overwhelming, confusing amount of information, it must “be fixed and exhibited in due order,” using “tables and co-ordinations of instances” according to a clear plan (56). The third step is interpretation, which must be done through Baconian method: “[T]he understanding, left to itself and to its own operation, is incompetent and unfit to construct its axioms without direction and support. Our third ministration, therefore, must be true and legitimate induction” (56).
Bacon uses the example of heat both to begin work using his own method and to show others how to follow it, drawing up tables that categorize his observations. He explains why this vast amount of assiduous written logging is necessary: The amount of observational materials exceeds the human capacity for memory. Methodical records are therefore central to the Baconian approach. Even then, however, Bacon’s assertion of the fallibility of human nature (part of his critique of current epistemology) necessitates the use of further tools or aids during the interpretative phase. In Aphorism 21, Bacon lists the “remaining helps of the understanding with regard to the interpretation of nature, and a true and perfect induction” (77), which he plans to detail. He spends the remainder of Book 2 focusing on the first of these aids, a list of “prerogative instances,” or ways to categorize various phenomena, planning to cover the others in later works.
As well as presenting the details of his approach and offering justification for these steps, Bacon offers important context regarding its proposed usage by both scientists and society. He stresses that he alone cannot complete the work and that his discussion likely contains flaws, as the information he is working with is derived from old approaches and therefore unsound. He therefore urges both the adoption and perfection of his system, saying that it is important that he and any reader “by no means rest satisfied with what we have hitherto enforced, but push the matter further, and contrive and prepare more powerful aid for the use of the understanding” (73). He promises that he will write further on this but reiterates that others must participate. Bacon acknowledges that his epistemological renewal is incomplete but invokes his conviction in human progress to argue that it can and must be built on.
Bacon also outlines what subjects his approach will cover: “We certainly intend to comprehend them all” (48). He argues that just as the syllogism was applied to all subjects, so Baconian method can be:
[W]e [can] form a history and tables of invention for anger, fear, shame, and the like, and also for examples in civil life, and the mental operations of memory, composition, division, judgment, and the rest, as well as for heat and cold, light, vegetation, and the like (48).
His method therefore incorporates not just natural science but also topics like the human condition and civic affairs. Bacon acknowledges the diversity of these topics and the wide range of instructions his method will therefore need to incorporate to enable the right approach to each one. The “Great Instauration” is therefore presented as a revolution impacting human understanding of every imaginable topic, on multiple levels.
However, Bacon does offer a caveat regarding the use of his method. He suggests that current approaches are useful in a more everyday setting to encourage debate, aid with teaching, or facilitate civic administration. He therefore proposes that his system and existing ones serve complementary roles: “Let there be in short one method of cultivating the sciences, and another of discovering them” (7). The Baconian method is the second one in this suggestion: It is a tool of advancement, whereas old practices may serve more short-term and superficial purposes.
Bacon therefore builds a comprehensive picture of his “Great Instauration” in Novum Organum. He not only outlines and explains his process but also begins it himself, creating a template for others to follow. Furthermore, he places his suggestions into a broader context, explaining where they stand in relation to existing approaches and to human progress and discussing how they will fit into society. He treats this work as the first part of the “Great Instauration” itself: one that introduces it but also begins it, to be followed by more progress not just from him but from a broader community of scientists and philosophers.
