On Human Nature

In moving from heredity to development, Edward O. Wilson now approaches the topic of emergence and consciousness. One of the principal problems of emergence is that of free will, and how it is to be discussed within the kind of genetic determinism and materialism that scientific inquiry seems to favor. The question boils down to this: “if our genes are inherited and our environment is a train of physical events set in motion before we were born, how can there be a truly independent agent within the brain?” (71). Free will may very well be an illusion. Regardless of the truth—a matter of philosophy, not biology—the decisions and actions of an individual are free and unpredictable, but those of communities and societies can be predicted with enough data.

The emergence of conscious will is due to various evolutionary mechanisms that provide “feedback loops” (77)—which then allow for an organism to control behavior. This is not to diminish the complexity of the human mind, but it does help place the human mind and the human will (as the seat of desire and action) in their proper place. Even if the mind is “truly mechanistic” (77), this doesn’t mean a human’s mind can be predicted the same way one can predict the outcome of a mathematical algorithm or computer program.

However, it is true that human behavior is conditioned and governed “in a second and weaker sense” (77). Human behavior is conditioned to favor particular choices and outcomes based on genetic predispositions at the individual level, and it is possible to discover the statistical probability of behavior at the societal level. With this in mind, it is also possible to assert that “Lamarckian evolution” can occur rapidly within a population, where scientific investigation can recognize “the transmission to offspring of traits acquired during the lifetime of the parent” (78). Culturally and behaviorally, certain learned traits and habits can be passed on to offspring in ways that cannot be passed on genetically. In other words, Wilson believes offspring can inherit traits related to their parents’ manner of work—which has since been disputed.

When examining the characteristics of civilizations across eras, a remarkable confluence of traits and behaviors stand out in a way that renders mere coincidence or cultural cross-pollination impossible. Similarities in culture, religion, architecture, and the like are the result of genetic predisposition. The key to this emergence in the form of civilizations is what Wilson dubs hypertrophy, “the extreme growth of pre-existing structures” (89).

In the animal world, Wilson frames the cranial bones of an elk skull (that eventually sprout into antlers) as an example of hypertrophy. In human society, the author claims “the basic social responses of the hunter-gatherers have metamorphosed from relatively modest environmental adaptations into unexpectedly elaborate, even monstrous forms in more advanced societies” (89). In other words, the relatively inconsequential modes of behavior or forms of societal organization that existed when human communities were smaller have remained—despite the human species surpassing its initial stage of evolution, when certain behavior was advantageous. Now that human society has advanced, communities need to rethink traditional modes of behavior and organization.