On Justice Power and Human Nature

According to Woodruff, what made Thucydides’s approach to events new was his attention to human dynamics as causal agents instead of, as in Homer’s work especially, causality being determined in the dynamic between superhuman forces and mortals. Thucydides was concerned especially with the force that ananke (compulsion) exerts on human decision-making. “[A]mbition, fear, and advantage” (36) are all pivotal parts of this compulsion—but none more than fear. The chief cause of the Peloponnesian war wasn’t how powerful Athens really was but how powerful Sparta perceived Athens to be and its fear of this perceived power. This fear made Sparta disinclined to pursue peaceful solutions to their and their allies’ grievances against Athens.

When superhuman forces are involved, humans may feel that they’re making choices—and may be making them—but the end is predetermined. Fate is unavoidable. Thucydides didn’t seem to believe that outcomes were inevitable in the same way. Instead, he suggested that when humans believe certain outcomes are inevitable, they behave in a way that brings those outcomes to pass; they may have other options but don’t recognize them as such. This is demonstrated repeatedly throughout Woodruff’s collection, perhaps most starkly in the contrast between Athens’s behavior in the Mytilenean dialogue of 427 BC and the Melos debate of 416, events with overlapping concerns that ended very differently.

The Mytilenean dialogue happened a few years into the war. Early on, Pericles had warned Athens that its empire “is really like a tyranny—though it may have been thought unjust to seize it, it is now unsafe to surrender” (90). Right or wrong, they must protect their empire to protect themselves. This is reflected in the Mytilenean debate between Cleon and Diodotus. Neither made claims to justice, but they offered opposing suggestions for what was in Athens’s best interests. Cleon insisted that a firm hand would inspire the proper amount of fear, while Diodotus argued that clemency would prevent reactionaries from retaliating. Showing mercy to those who deserved it was ultimately determined to be in Athens’s best interests. This decision was arrived at dispassionately for the good of Athens, not out of concern for the Mytileneans and proper conduct. Under Diodotus’s guidance, the Athenians didn’t allow strong emotion (anger or fear) to dictate their decision. They made a conscious choice.

Their conduct towards Melos, which came later in the war, was more brutal but also less conscious, as portrayed by Thucydides. In the Mytilenean debate, the Athenians made no appeals to justice, only to expediency and fear of how their other allies might interpret leniency. To justify themselves, Athens declared that justice was relevant only when “both sides are under equal compulsion” (136), meaning of equal strength. Since Melos was the weaker party, they had no choice but to capitulate. Melos resisted this characterization, insisting that in fact they were being forced to choose between freedom and enslavement. Athens again turned the situation around, allowing the Melians to have a choice but framing it as between survival and death—the underlying assumption seemingly being that survival is always preferable to death. The Melians, however, chose to fight and die free rather than submit. Nevertheless, Athens never acknowledged that it could have chosen another path.