Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938

Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley’s Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 is a comprehensive look at the US foreign policy from the 1930s path toward the Second World War until the early-21st century and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This book initially appeared in 1971 and is now in its 9th edition, the Penguin Group’s Kindle version (2010) of which is used here.

Summary

The authors examine several important historic events and policies during the Cold War, including the 1947 Truman Doctrine and containment, the 1948 Marshall Plan, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the Korean (1950-1953) and Vietnam Wars (1955-1975), and the nuclear-arms treaties. They also discuss the changes that American foreign policy underwent after the collapse of the world order in the late 1980s-early 1990s as the US searched for a new role in the transformed world.

Rise to Globalism comprises 21 chronological chapters. Each chapter covers up to a decade and usually focuses on the administration of a specific president, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush, his style of foreign policy, along with key events and challenges. At times, the authors discuss the personalities of the leaders in question and the relationships between them. For example, the dynamics between Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin within the Grand Alliance during the Second World War defined not only the course of that war on the way to victory but also the postwar order, especially in Europe. Certain historic events, such as the Vietnam War, span more than one chapter because they require an in-depth analysis due to their complexity and duration.

There are several recurrent themes in Rise to Globalism. These themes range from the general trends in US foreign policy to the relationship between the president, Congress, and domestic public opinion. The first theme is the paradox of American foreign policy: the US transformed from a major power with a generally neutral foreign policy in the 1930s to a global superpower after 1945. However, the authors argue, this transformation and an unprecedented degree of power the US wielded did not make the country any safer. Indeed, as a result of involvement in many parts of the world, the US faced a growing number of challenges. One direct consequence of this development during the Cold War was the growth of defense spending, the 1949 establishment of NATO, and the increase in its nuclear-arms arsenal.

The dynamics between the president, the Congress and other state institutions and organizations, and the public opinion at home is another important subject in this text. Ambrose and Brinkley document how this relationship changed over time. For example, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, ordinary Americans opposed involvement in a European conflict regretting the experience of the First World War. President Roosevelt, too, acted cautiously and preferred supplying the Allies through Lend-Lease rather than boots on the ground. The Congress, however, was more assertive. In contrast, by the early 1970s, the Congress began limiting Nixon’s ability to get deeper involved in the Vietnam War as his administration engaged in mass-scale bombing campaigns in Southeast Asia with a significant civilian death toll. This war was also accompanied by the largest antiwar protests in American history. Ordinary people and public intellectuals alike reexamined America’s foreign policy. In certain cases, presidential overreach caused a scandal and a federal investigation, as was the case with the mid-1980s Iran-Contras Affair during Ronald Reagan’s presidency.

The American Cold War policy of containment—and its benefits and drawbacks—is another focal point in Rise to Globalism. The containment policy, designed by such statesmen as George Kennan, was global in nature and sought to challenge Communism where it arose. The authors examine how containment, according to the American side, was an imperfect but working solution to the Cold War geopolitical power shift in Europe. The division of Europe into spheres of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union arose from the Grand Alliance World War II conferences forming the structure of the postwar world order. Often, Europeans were left out of the decision-making. However, the containment policy failed in Asia. The American leaders did not sufficiently account for the process of decolonization—as was the case with Indochina seeking independence from France—and the resilience of Vietnamese resistance in a war of liberation in the face of a foreign invasion. The authors believe that the containment policy was, in part, to blame for the duration and the staggering costs of the Vietnam War.

Ambrose and Brinkley also discuss the complex interplay of meddling in other countries’ politics: backing less-than-savory leaders and groups that are friendly to the West such as Chiang Kai-shek, funding insurgencies, such as the Contras in Latin America, and overthrowing governments, such as the 1953 Iran coup by the CIA. Of course, the United States would not accept meddling in its own affairs in this manner—nor would the country accept a different ideology in its sphere of influence, as was the case with post-revolutionary Cuba and the 1961 Bay of Pigs. The authors highlight how this policy backfired, such as in the Iran-Contra scandal.

By and large, the authors also attempt to remain objective. They address the perception and concerns of America’s adversaries in wars, such as imperial Japan, and its geopolitical and ideological opponents, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For example, the American oil embargo presented a serious challenge to Japan and was one of the contributing factors to that country’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. It was this attack that drew the US into the Second World War. Similarly, the authors acknowledge the Soviet security concerns in Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and the placement of nuclear missiles in Turkey on Soviet borders, which resulted in the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis.

Rise to Globalism remains an important overview of the history of US foreign policy in the 20th century and beyond. By focusing on major historic events and trends in international relations from the American perspective, Ambrose and Brinkley help understand how the United States transformed through its own behavior—and how it transformed the world.