The American Crisis

In these essays, Paine seeks to empower Americans to recognize their own agency and view themselves as capable of achieving independence from Britain. He paints the issue as one of intention and resolve, rather than chance, writing that America will decide whether to be a victor or a victim. Paine claims that Americans are increasingly committed to independence and are still willing to make sacrifices for its cause.

He credits the association of merchants, tradesmen and civilians in Philadelphia who treat the new state money as having the value of gold or silver. He also extols a volunteer network which fundraises for the “Pennsylvania Line,” the local branch of the Continental Army. He uses these examples to illustrate America’s public support. He argues that it is this continued support from the common people that will defeat the “withered head of tyranny” in America. Paine’s use of “withered” here suggests that Britain is already failing in their war efforts.

Paine continues his theme of military analysis in these essays. He dissects Britain’s decisions in order to downplay their recent success in Charleston, writing that Britain’s decline is obvious, and he accuses them of attacking Charleston only because they could not successfully strike anywhere else. Paine calls this “piece-meal work” which cannot win the war for Britain (111). He reiterates that the British cannot conquer America and that they way they’re conducting the war reveals their weakness. Paine claims that America is too extensive to conquer by simply capturing towns and garrisons, and he observes that if the British further divided their forces, they would all be vulnerable to attack.

Paine’s painstaking analysis of America’s and Britain’s finances show his understanding of how money—or lack thereof—would be a deciding factor in the war. Paine addresses his American readers with a singular goal in mind: to convince them of the immense necessity of paying more taxes specifically to fund the war effort. He accuses the average American of not understanding how much money is necessary to fund the war effort, citing a recent petition submitted to the Assembly of Pennsylvania which asked for a decrease in taxes.

Considering the federal budget, Paine finds that there is a “deficiency” of 185,720 pounds from the state of Pennsylvania alone, and other states have similar deficiencies, which he blames for why the army’s troops are underfed, underpaid, and poorly clothed. He states that this underfunding is leaving America insecure amidst a “nerveless” military campaign and persuades American readers to see that funding a strong defense is essential to their well-being. He argues that America should invest in establishing a navy and estimates its price at 1,200,000 pounds.

The tone and purpose of Paine’s writing now shifts from fiery preaching to sober and detailed policy analysis. Rather than simply responding to the actions or comments of major figures, Paine now invents and defends his own policies, which he hopes civilian readers and government officials will seriously consider. He gives his readers context by analyzing America’s tax system for its 3 million citizens. He claims the war has cost America 2 million pounds annually which is thirteen shillings and four pence per person. Paine argues that if the British government won the war it would tax American colonists at the British rate, which Paine says is 11 times as much as what Americans currently pay (115).

Paine argues that a tax of 13 and fourpence per American would be enough to effectively expel the British from the country (123). He claims that such a tax would not harm anyone, but the damage and destruction caused by a successful British invasion would be devastating to Pennsylvanians. He defends his tax by asking the American people if it is better to raise 2 million pounds to secure their independence than to pay 6 million pounds to Britain.

Paine uses his platform to suggest a variety of ways that the government may raise the money it needs. Paine recommends imposing a duty, which must be paid in gold or silver, on imported goods and “prize goods” and another tax for landed property and houses. He argues that a duty on goods is a fair and convenient way to collect necessary taxes because a person pays dependent on their consumption, and so wealthier people pay more than those who cannot afford to. He also notes that this kind of tax feels more optional, which he sees positive. He also suggests requiring a tax of one bushel of wheat for every twenty acres of land, and that the militias could impose fines on people who refused to serve in them, although he states that fines are the “most unsuited to the minds of a free country” (127).

Another potentially controversial law that Paine supports is conscription, which he states is as effective, and cheaper, than hiring militiamen (112-113). He explains that a law has been passed in his state which drafts two men from each militia, which will add more than a thousand troops to the Continental Army. Paine’s obsessive attention to detail make these essays less engaging than his previous work, but also help to bolster his arguments, which were likely unpopular with many Americans who were seeking freedom from British taxes.