The Demon in the Freezer

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States government called on prominent virology researchers, including Peter Jahrling and the seventy-three year-old D.A. Henderson. The anthrax from the letter that reached Tom Daschle was brought to USAMRIID, where Tom Geisbert determined that he was dealing with a high-quality, effectively purified sample of anthrax spores. Anthrax itself consists of cells (not simply of virus particles) and spreads by killing its hosts, seeping from their rotting bodies into the soil, and finding new hosts. Jahrling and another high-ranking official, Major General John S. Parker, are quickly alerted to Geisbert’s work. In the meantime, mail workers begin to fall ill as the direct result of passing exposure to or simply being present in the facilities that transmitted anthrax letters.

Parker reports to the U.S. Senate to discuss the severity of the threat posed by the anthrax. Jahrling, for his part, tries to explain the quality and potency of the anthrax to the CDC, but the significance of the descriptive words that he chooses (“energetic,” “professional”) is not readily apparent to his contacts. Regardless of how it is described, the anthrax was apparently created by an expert who knew the “anthrax trick” of engineering the anthrax to form clumps (or “skulls”) that would crumble in a manner meant to optimize dispersal. Jahrling and Parker were summoned to report some of their findings to the White House. Unfortunately, as Attorney General John Ashcroft pointed out during the White House meeting, communication had broken down between agencies such as the FBI and the CDC—agencies that would need to keep in closer contact going forward. Unfortunately for Jahrling, the White House summons had distracted him from family duties, such as picking up his daughter from a dance class—leaving his wife confused and irritated as well.

Preston draws on a visit he paid to William Patrick, a biowarfare specialist and a friend of Ken Alibek, one of the bioweapons researchers who defected from Russia. Together, Patrick and Alibek use household goods to show how easily bioweapons can be dispersed. Preston also reveals a further reason for the potency of the mailed anthrax: the spores were mixed with finely-ground glass that would facilitate easy movement and spreading. Already a fearsome bioweapon, the anthrax is also one with no clear and traceable source, as becomes apparent in the course of the inconclusive investigation into the “Amerithrax” case (as the anthrax incident comes to be known) waged by the FBI. Some suspicion, however, is cast on Steve Hatfill, a researcher who turns out to have falsified some of his credentials. For all these uncertainties, a few conclusions do emerge. D.A. Henderson decides it would be futile for him to promote his long-lived idea of eradicating smallpox stores, and now seeks to contribute to Jahrling’s research efforts, which are gaining momentum. In 2002, six epidemiologists also meet to discuss models related to the spread of smallpox; the National Institutes of Health arranged the meeting. Five out of the six experts were convinced that smallpox, in current times, would rank among the most devastating biological weapons possible.