The Division of Labor in Society

In Chapter 5, Durkheim introduces two more core concepts to his theory on the division of labor: organic and mechanical solidarity. The former is a strong solidarity and social bond resulting from the division of labor. The latter is a weaker form of solidarity and social bond present in “primitive” societies formed through adhering to the common consciousness. Durkheim sets out to prove, using historical examples, that mechanical solidarity has gradually given way to organic solidarity. In the same way, penal law has receded from legislating certain aspects of life—such as domestic life—as society becomes more differentiated.

The division of labor, by nature of being divisive rather than uniting, might seem to forge weaker social bonds than those in “primitive” societies, which are based on commonalities. However, Durkheim insists it is in fact the exact opposite: “Primitive” societies encourage each individual to embody the whole of social life. Therefore, any one member can be removed or added without disturbing the group. He uses case studies to prove this point: The Balondas in Southern Africa and the Romans all built societies through bonds of similarity, yet individual members easily rose up against their chiefs if they felt it necessary or advantageous. Other “lower” societies, such as “North American Indians,” have very lax rules for naturalization and have no qualm integrating foreign elements so long as they conform to the common consciousness. In contrast, societies that forge bonds through the division of labor are not easily divided because every part is essential to the proper functioning of the aggregate. For example, if Middlesex were isolated from the rest of London, its social processes would be crushed from a lack of supplies and social life would be deeply perturbed. Durkheim likens this to cutting away an organ from an organism. The division of labor, despite being divisive, forges a stronger bond between individuals and society.

Durkheim concludes that as societies modernize, they lose entire subclasses of repressive law. In earlier times, the domestic sphere was dictated by The Ten Commandments, which punished disobedience or unfilial acts by death. Now, it has largely lost this religious and penal character. Only adultery and bigamy are still regulated by criminal law. Durkheim observes how religious criminality has, over the course of history, become divorced from penal law. He cites the development of Christianity as an example of this, noting how Christianity sketches broad ideals for people to follow but does not prescribe specific practices, thus allowing for a wide range of interpretation. This in turn encouraged an increasingly detached attitude toward religious sanction in the common consciousness, allowing for the disappearance of religious criminality as a type of penal law in modern industrialized society. Durkheim concludes that insomuch as religion used to glue social bonds and act as a central component of the common consciousness, it has gradually receded from the political, economic, and scientific spheres as individual sentiments began to diversify from the division of labor.

Although entire subsections of criminal law have disappeared over the ages, Durkheim notes there are certain tenets that withhold the test of time and are nearly universal. Such rules include, for example, the strict forbidding of homicide, which serves to hold the fabric of society together. Durkheim argues that this is true even of “lower” societies, despite recent anthropological and sociological findings. For example, Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso argued that some “primitive” groups effaced individuality for the sake of communism, thereby allowing acts of murder.

Contrary to his peers, Durkheim does not believe “primitive” societies to be entirely dispossessed of morality. He argues that although individual acts of murder might not be condemned, an unlimited encouragement of them would bring chaos and threaten the fabrics of the social bond. Durkheim points out that it is the exception that makes the rule, and uses this rhetoric to anticipate counterarguments.

In Chapter 6, Durkheim argues that historical progress is characterized by the inevitable shift from a purely mechanical solidarity to an organic one. This position assumes that time is linear and historical progression predetermined. To prove his point, Durkheim observes how “primitive” societies have gradually “evolved.”

The purest form of mechanical solidarity is one where each individual part is indistinguishable from the other, and together form a wholly homogenous amalgamation. Durkheim dubs this aggregate a “horde.” He believes North American Iroquois tribes exemplify this type of social organization: Their tribes are made of small, incomplete societies where men and women, commoners and chiefs all hold equal status. There is no division and no diversity in these hordes, whose social glue is mainly forged through a common consciousness shared among all individual members.

At the next stage of differentiation are “clans.” These include a more extensive group formed of various “hordes,” which bond through political or familial alliances. In these mechanical societies, religion plays a central role in regulating their beliefs and practices. The more homogeneous a mechanical society is, the closer and more cohesive it is.

Organic solidarity allows for the development of an entirely different kind of societal organization, one that is “coordinated and subordinated to one another around the same central organ, which exerts over the rest of the organism a moderating effect” (132). There is an interdependence between the central organ and its peripheries; the central organ enjoys some privileges but can only survive if it effectively manages the sum of its parts. Durkheim believes that mechanical and organic solidarity are so vastly different that societies built on organic solidarity can only emerge when those built on mechanical solidarity have vanished.

Durkheim defends this position by observing how civilizations have evolved over time. He notes that once “primitive” societies grow out of a pure form of mechanical solidarity, they begin to develop segmentary organization, a type of division that groups people in terms of their social activity rather than their ancestral relationships. This allows for greater mobility and integration, but is not yet as accepting of diversification as organic solidarity sprung from the division of labor.

Segmentary organization is still molded around existing frameworks in a social group. For example, Levites who integrated into the Jewish community naturally gravitated to occupy priestly functions, just like before. Thus, as mechanical solidarity gives way to organic solidarity and segmentary organization vanishes in favor of a proper division of labor, bonds that had previously been founded upon hereditary and territorial factors slowly disintegrate, replaced by a new type of social organization based on profession. This same law is mirrored in biological evolution: “Lower” animals are homogeneous in composition and are no more than the sum of their parts, whereas more complex animals develop individuality.

However, just as there are no practical examples of societies in a pure state of mechanical solidarity, so has humanity not yet evolved to embody everything that the division of labor can achieve. The chapter closes on a critique of sociologist Herbert Spencer’s ethical implications of natural selection. Durkheim refutes the Lamarckian idea that complex learned traits can be entirely passed down to future generations. He proposes instead that only uncomplicated physiological traits can realistically be inherited.