The Federalist Papers

Hamilton is happy to report that the method of electing the President has met with little resistance from even the Constitution’s most ardent critics. Each state will choose electors to vote for the President. The number of electors per state will be equal to the number of that state’s representatives and senators. It is crucial, Hamilton states, that these bodies are newly formed every four years for this purpose, to safeguard against foreign tampering of individual electors. For that same reason, these individuals cannot be sitting senators, representatives, or other officers of the federal government.

According to Hamilton, what most distinguishes the President from a hereditary monarch is that the President must be reelected by state electors every four years. Moreover, the President can be impeached and removed from office if convicted by the Senate of “treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors” (351).

Among the President’s powers include the ability to veto a bill passed by the House and Senate, at which point the bill must be approved by two-thirds of both legislative bodies to become a law. This also distinguishes the President from the king of Great Britain, who has absolute authority to cancel any bill passed by Parliament with no recourse available to the legislature. The President will also be the commander-in-chief of the US armed forces, and he will be empowered to grant pardons and reprieves, except to those who have been impeached. By contrast, the governor of New York may grant pardons to those who have been impeached by state legislatures. Hamilton makes this distinction to point out that despite fears that the Constitution gives the President too much power, in some ways the office will be less powerful than state-level executives already in existence.

Hamilton discusses the objection that “a vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government” (357). Contrary to this view, Hamilton believes that an energetic executive branch is critical to protect the country against foreign adversaries and to administer the laws faithfully while safeguarding against anarchy. To ensure a strong and energetic executive, the office must remain both dependent on and responsible for the people. Hamilton also emphasizes the importance of a unified executive, which is why he favors a single President as opposed to the executive councils which often ended in disaster in ancient Rome and Greece. He writes, “Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number” (358). In addition, Hamilton says, a plurality of executives “tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility” (361).

Hamilton addresses the four-year terms selected for the President. He argues that this term length strikes an advantageous balance, in that it is short enough to ensure that the President remains sensitive to the will of the people, but long enough that the administration’s policies will have a measure of stability.

Hamilton believes that the President should be eligible for reelection for many reasons. For one, absent hopes of reelection, Presidents will be tempted to betray the public trust and enrich themselves for the duration of their term. Another important consideration is that a President with four years of experience in the office will be that much better-suited to serve another four.

It is crucial to the independence of the executive, Hamilton writes, that the President’s salary remain stable for the duration of their term. Should the legislature be empowered to increase or reduce the President’s salary at will, this could place the executive in the thrall of lawmakers, violating the maxim concerning the separation of powers. Hamilton also revisits the importance of the President’s veto power which, unlike that of the king of Great Britain, is not absolute

In returning to the President’s role as commander-in-chief, Hamilton emphasizes that the President may only command state militias during wartime when they are “called into the actual service of the United States” (375). Hamilton also addresses critics who believe that the President should be required to consult Congress when pardoning citizens convicted of treason. Contrary to these objections, Hamilton believes that by granting the executive branch sole power to pardon individuals with treason convictions, the President may quickly cool tensions in the wake of an insurrection.

Hamilton calls the provision concerning the President’s power to make treaties with the Senate’s advice and consent “one of the best digested and most unexceptionable parts of the plan” (381). He dismisses objections that the provision constitutes an inappropriate “intermixture of powers” on the grounds that it is another example of the checks and balances needed to prevent the usurpation of one branch over another. In response to those who believe that treaties should be made by the legislature alone because they are laws, Hamilton draws a distinction between laws dictated from sovereign to citizen and treaties, which are agreements between two sovereigns.

Under the Constitution, the President will be responsible for appointing ambassadors, public ministers, Supreme Court justices, and any other federal officers “whose appointments are not otherwise provided for in the Constitution” (385). Hamilton finds it advantageous to invest this power in one individual whose sole reputation rests on these appointment decisions. However, to guard against favoritism or the appointment of “unfit characters,” this power is checked by the Senate, which may block the President’s appointees.

Hamilton adds that Senate approval of appointments leads to greater stability in government. For example, a new incoming President will be less likely to replace fit and capable appointees due to the risk that the Senate may not approve of the replacements.